

THE GUARDIAN (UK)
27 March 1981

The hunt for n that ended in tun

CHAPMAN PINCHER, the former defence correspondent of the Daily Express, dedicates his new book to "the loyal members of the Security and Intelligence Services on whom, so much depends."

As many of his latest charges are quite different from allegations in his previous book *Inside Story*, and as they depend heavily on information from self-styled "loyal" secret servicemen, it is important to get his mole-hunting act into perspective.

A belief that the highest levels of the Secret Service have been penetrated by traitors as yet undiscovered has been common in three countries—Britain, Canada and the US—throughout the 1970s.

In Britain, as has now been confirmed by the Prime Minister, this led finally to the investigation of Sir Roger Hollis, head of MI5 from 1956 to 1965. But the faction within MI5 who were convinced he was a mole were declared wrong. This means, if Mrs Thatcher is right and Mr Pincher is wrong, that a great deal of effort was spent on trying to put manacles on Sir Roger Hollis which might have been better snapped on real Soviet spies.

A similar thing happened in Canada, in 1972. Leslie Bennett, head of the counter-intelligence branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, pursued John Watkins, sometime Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union, with allegations from defectors that Watkins had been homosexually blackmailed. Attempts to force a confession ended when Watkins had a fatal heart attack.

Afterwards his juniors and departmental enemies raised the suspicion that Bennett himself worked for the KGB. Anatoly Golitsin, who in 1962 defected to the United States from the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, and who has been the source of literally hundreds of allegations,

Bennett, despite his high position, was hauled off to an Ottawa "safe house" and grilled for four days. He failed to furnish a confession and was retired on "medical grounds." He left for Australia and now lives in obscurity in a suburb of Perth, apparently a ruined man. He was officially stated in the Canadian parliament to have been cleared, and he is in the middle of a libel action against a Canadian author who wrote a thinly-fictionalised book called *Portrait of a Spy*.

His US counterpart, and a molehunter of considerable fame, was James Jesus Angleton, head of counter-intelligence for the CIA, whose suspicious Pincher quotes approvingly in his book. What Pincher does not say is that Angleton himself fell victim to bureaucratic infighting after he became convinced, partly by his history of having been duped in Washington by the British secret serviceman and KGB agent Kim Philby, that a "mole" was high up in the CIA itself.

His suspicions were fuelled by the same defector, Golitsin: anti-Soviet operations were suspended and not only senior CIA officers but subsequent defectors came under suspicion as Soviet plants. One, Nosenko, was even locked up by the CIA under solitary confinement for four years, in an effort to make him confess.

In 1967, another faction of CIA officers gained the ascendancy, and Nosenko was released, and rehabilitated. Angleton's suspicions had reached as far as Averell Harriman former ambassador to Moscow, and the atmosphere of suspicion inside the CIA was poisoning its anti-Soviet work. Clare Petty, one of the counter-intelligence staff, produced a long report detailing what evidence there was that Angleton himself was a KGB agent. "The case against Angleton was a great compilation of circumstantial material," he said, "it was not a clear-cut case."

In effect, it was nothing more than a demonstration that a conspiratorial view of the world could be turned against anyone—even its in-

asked Angleton to resign was assumed at the time was because he was in charge of an illegal domestic anti-war protesters surveillance operation. In fact, Colby came to believe what he described as "tortuous conspiracy theories about the long arm of a powerful and wily KGB at work over decades" were doing more harm than good.

The Pincher view of the world is bedevilled by defectors. They are the main means of discovering spies inside one's own secret service, and certainly MI5 and MI6 were demonstrably incapable of spotting them on their own behalf. But defectors, as James Callaghan pointed out in the Blunt debate, can be genuine, or deliberate impostors, or people deliberately fed with some misleading information by already-suspicious Russians.

Goloniewski, Golitsin, Nosenko, Gouzenko, Lyalin—the history of spy-catching since the war is a history of these names and what they had to say. Pincher is, in effect, a Golitsin man, as was his source for much material, a retired and somewhat embittered Angleton. It was Golitsin who made the famous accusation that there was a "ring of five" British spies—eventually identified as Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and an anonymous scientist.

But Golitsin also made wild allegations—that the Sino-Soviet split was all a charade, and that a party leader, possibly Hugh Gaitskell, was assassinated by the KGB. It seemed to people like Angleton, locked up in a transatlantic anti-communist world, that the succession of Harold Wilson to the Labour leadership was a clear plus for the Kremlin, and therefore the idea was plausible.

For many of Pincher's informants—and he himself—arrange the material available, which can always be interpreted several ways, as Mrs Thatcher said, to imply that the biggest danger of all comes from British Left-wingers and the Labour Party itself. The "loyalists" on whom he relies, have poli-

quotes, and who has been most passionate in spotlighting, as Pincher does, what are claimed to be large numbers of MP-spies, mostly Labour, but also Tory.

But Mr Young, although unquestionably a loyal patriot, is a man of extreme political views. He played a key role in the plots to overthrow the Middle East nationalists Mossadeq in Iran and Nasser in Egypt, both of which led to lasting resentments in the area and a political crisis bigger than the Promumo affair, over Suez.

After he left MI6, he worked for the merchant bankers Kleinwort Benson, and then dabbled in Right-wing fringe politics, trying to take over the Monday Club, making anti-immigrant films, calling for repatriation of immigrants, and describing them in racist terms.

An undertow of Pincher's book—and presumably the world-view shared by his sources in the CIA and in Britain—is that KGB machinations are the most dangerous threat in the world. He goes on to sketch a scenario in which "crypto-communist" Left-wing MPs have taken over the Labour Party, starting in the days of Gaitskell (when he was enlisted by George Brown, he says, to help in the crypto-hunt); continuing with Wilson, who was too soft on security risks, and culminating with the arrival of Michael Foot as leader of the party.

Foot's stated determination to pursue nuclear disarmament and the party's stated intention of eliminating US defence bases in Britain have the Kremlin's total support. So too did the overthrow of Macmillan after the Profumo scandal had them dancing in the Kremlin, Pincher implies.

This culminates in a bold description of Tom Driberg, the former Labour MP, homosexual, Russophile and old acquaintance of Foot, as a dedicated traitor, working both for MI5 and the KGB. When it was pointed out to